By Nicola Jentzsch
In this up to date version, writer Nicola Jentzsch presents an in-depth research of the economics and law of monetary privateness. You get a comparative assessment of credits reporting platforms within the US and within the 27 member states of the eu Union. this is often the "most in-depth research of the historical past and economics of credits reporting to date," based on David Medine, former affiliate Director of the U.S. Federal exchange Commission.
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Additional resources for Financial Privacy: An International Comparison of Credit Reporting Systems
This had to be regulated by law and stood at approximately US-$ 8 in 2004 adjusted for inflation. Commercial users of credit reports pay far less than US-$ 1 and only a couple of cents in Europe. The industry justifies this asymmetric pricing by arguing that dealing with follow-up questions by consumers is expensive. To remedy some of these problems, a variety of policy proposals have been put forth, but these cannot be discussed here. The part of this study on regulation will allow some conclusions in this respect.
Some newer exemptions are Gehrig (1998), Mester (1994) and Khalil and Parigi (2001). Mester (1994) is interested in credit card rate “stickiness” which she investigates by using a screening model of consumer credit markets. The initial observation is that while the 20 And sometimes no equilibrium exists at all. 46 2 Theory of Information and Privacy costs of funds have fallen in the past, credit card rates have remained high. The author shows that banks only sometimes use collateral as a screening device.
Some information items will have negative welfare consequences such as bankruptcy information, leading to higher credit risk and higher prices for credit. The individual will have an incentive to conceal that fact. Demand for personal information is driven by the efficiency of the “economics of correlation” where it is possible to predict risk or approximate profitability in areas unrelated to credit (insurance, employment). The next sections discuss microeconomic theory, incentives of data disclosure and their effects on market outcome.